This paper provides new evidence on progress in transition and the progress toward 'readiness' for accession that has been made by enterprises in two EU-applicant countries. A major innovation is the use of a market economy and member country of the EU -Spain -as a benchmark against which to measure such progress. A detailed survey was designed and administered to approximately 200 manufacturing firms in each of Poland, Romania and Spain. New private firms (firms established as private ab initio) in both Poland and Romania are found to be growing the fastest, but on measures of integration and investment, it is Polish ab initio private firms and privatised firms that look most similar to Spanish ones. Polish state-owned firms, and most Romanian enterprises, typically are less integrated. With respect to compliance with EU directives, Polish firms tend to lag behind Spanish ones but lie significantly ahead of those in Romania. Levels of awareness of and compliance with directives does not vary with ownership type amongst the Eastern European firms. Progress in transition at the country level seems to be consistent with improvements in compliance with the major components of the acquis communautaire.
Introduction
Recent economic assessments of the 'gap' between transition countries seeking accession to the EU and member countries have used the results of simple cross-country growth regressions to derive estimates of the likely time required for the current differences in levels of per capita income to be closed (e.g., Fischer et al. (1998) , EBRD (1997) Chapter 6). Such estimates rely on the application of relationships observed for market economies in the post-war period. These relationships are used in conjunction with data on income per head in the transition economies and a small number of other macroeconomic aggregates such as the share of investment and government consumption in GDP, the rate of population growth and school enrolment rates. Typical results from studies of this kind suggest that a country in the first accession wave such as Poland would converge to the level of per capita income in the three lowest income EU countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) over a period of between 18 and 23 years (with a per capita growth rate of between 4.7% and 5.4% per annum), whereas a 'second-tier' accession applicant such as Romania would converge in about 35 years (with a growth rate of about 5.5% per annum).
These time periods for convergence are much longer than the timetable for accession envisaged in the current accords. The objective of this paper is to contribute to the debates on the progress that has been made by enterprises in their 'readiness for accession' and on 'how far transition economies are from Brussels' by providing direct microeconomic evidence from the comparison between enterprises in two large transition countries (Poland and Romania) and those in a large EU member state, Spain.
In order for countries from Central and Eastern Europe to join the EU, a number of conditions have to be met: (a) the existence of a market economy, (b) the capacity to withstand competitive pressures and (c) the capacity to take over and implement the acquis communautaire (i.e., the body of EU law and regulations) (see Grabbe and Hughes, 1998; Lavigne, 1998; Mayhew, 1998) . We designed a survey instrument to identify progress toward meeting these requirements in the transition countries and to provide benchmark data on existing standards and characteristics of firms within the EU. The survey was administered to approximately 200 firms in the manufacturing sector in each of Poland, Romania and Spain in the summer of 1998.
At the outset of transition, the Eastern European countries were characterised by the dominance of state ownership and absence of foreign ownership; the virtual absence of small and medium-sized firms; the absence of product market competition as a determinant of resource allocation, x-efficiency and enterprise survival; the prevalence of soft budget constraints in relation to both current and capital spending; and a pattern of trade dominated by sales within the former-CMEA area (see, e.g., Blanchard et al, 1990; Portes, 1993; World Bank, 1996) . The enterprises in the region produced products of poor quality using equipment that was frequently technologically obsolete, and that did not meet modern environmental standards (see Estrin, Gelb and Singh, 1995; Carlin et al, 1995) . Overmanning was rife at output levels that prevailed prior to the collapse characteristic of the early phase of transition (see Commander, 1995) .
Major changes along all these dimensions toward convergence with the characteristics of market economies have been recorded over the course of transition. Many enterprise level surveys have been conducted over the past seven or eight years with the objective of describing the pattern of change and identifying the proximate causes of changes in performance (see e.g. Estrin, Gelb and Singh, 1995; Belka et al, 1995; Claessens and Djankov, 1998; Frydman et al., 1998a, b) . Blanchard (1997) characterises the transition process for the enterprise sector as a gradual shift of employment and output from a low productivity state sector to a high productivity private sector, formed via privatisations and through the entry and growth of new firms. The early evidence (see, e.g., Pinto et al, 1993, Estrin, Gelb and suggests little difference in performance between state-owned and privatised firms.
Market-oriented adjustment was characteristic of firms of all ownership types in the first phase of 'reactive' or 'cost-oriented' restructuring as managers were forced to compete for markets for their output and could no longer rely on subsidies to cover losses (see, e.g., EBRD, 1995; Pinto et al, 1993; Carlin et al 1995) . Theoretical considerations suggested that 'deep' or 'strategic' restructuring would require profit-orientation most likely delivered by private ownership with effective corporate governance (see Boycko et al., 1995; Barberis et al., 1996) .
More recent evidence has identified significant differences in performance between state-owned and private firms in Central Europe, though not in Russia (see, e.g., Claessens and Djankov, 1998; Frydman et al., 1998a,b;  as against Estrin and Wright, 1999) . The transition literature suggests that ab initio firms should perform much like firms in market economies (see, e.g., Richter and Schaffer, 1996; Konings and Walsh, 1998) . By using the benchmark of the Spanish firms, this paper seeks to test this hypothesis.
Improved performance for existing firms as a market economy is established (i.e., state-owned and privatised firms) has been linked in the literature to the introduction of competition, the type of private ownership structure and the role of management turnover. One task of this paper is therefore to document the existing differences in perceived competition, in the extent of concentrated and foreign ownership and in managerial turnover between firms in transition countries and those in Spain. This allows us to provide some evidence relevant to the assessment of the ability of enterprises in transition countries to withstand the competitive pressures that would accompany accession.
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The third accession requirement relates to the capacity of enterprises to meet a set of key administrative requirements, the acquis communautaire. The survey instrument was designed to uncover the extent of compliance of firms in Poland and Romania -and also in Spain. The directives addressed were those relating to working time, equal pay, safety and health at work, emissions monitoring and product certification. Are compliance levels in these different spheres in the East European countries a legacy from the communist period or are they related to transition indicators such as privatisation or integration with the EU through exporting or foreign ownership? An effort was made to ascertain the cost of adjustment -if any -to achieve compliance, the kinds of costs incurred (e.g., fixed investment, training) and the extent to which assistance had been provided by government or foreign partners.
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section there is a brief summary of the survey design and sample selection criteria. Section three identifies the differences in the structural and performance characteristics of enterprises in the three countries. For example, do Polish and Romanian firms look more like each or more like Spanish ones in terms of their output and employment growth, or in terms of their ownership structure? Are firms in the transition economies rather similar in terms of their exporting activities or are there country or ownership differences? Section four addresses the compliance issues. It begins by describing the levels of compliance reported by firms in each of the three countries. The hypothesis that compliance for some directives is 'legacy-based' rather than 'transitionbased' is examined and we test for any link between the different transition indicators and compliance.
In section five, we draw together what can be learned from this survey about progress by enterprises toward 'readiness' for accession. We also present a comparison between the benefits and costs expected by the firms in pre-accession countries from membership of the EU with the retrospective evaluation of benefits and costs by the Spanish firms. Section six concludes with a summary of the major findings from this study.
Survey design
The survey covered 645 manufacturing firms in total: 215 from Spain, 223 from Poland and 207 from Romania. The sampling strategy was random selection from the databases maintained by the statistical offices in the cases of Poland and Romania, and from a large commercial database in the case of Spain, but with certain restrictions: -Firms were selected from the following manufacturing sectors only: mechanical engineering and transport, wood products and furniture, food processing, clothing and footwear, chemicals products, and electrical machinery. Furthermore, firms in the following activities were explicitly excluded: building and construction materials; manufacture of basic metals; shipbuilding; newspapers and other printing. There were no sectoral quotas; firms were selected randomly from the pool of allowable manufacturing sectors.
-Firms were selected from two locations in each country: Madrid and Barcelona in Spain, Warsaw and Katowice in Poland, Bucharest and Brasov in Romania.
-In each country, the size distribution of firms was to be divided into three comparably-sized groups:
small firms, employing 50-150 people; medium-sized firms, employing 150 to 500 people; and large firms, employing 500 to 5000 people. Firms employing fewer than 50 persons or more than 5000 were excluded from the survey.
-In Poland and Romania only, the ownership distribution of the firms included in the survey was to be divided into three groups: majority or 100% state-owned firms; privatised (previously stateowned) firms; and ab initio private firms. The small firm category in each of these countries was to be divided between ab initio firms (approximately 50%) and privatised or state-owned firms (approximately 50%). The medium-sized firm category was to be divided as with small firms. The large firm category was to be divided roughly equally between privatised firms and state-owned firms.
The sampling strategy was motivated by the following considerations. We were particularly interested in integration into the European economy, and hence limited the survey to manufacturing sectors likely to participate in foreign trade and/or to face competition from imports.
1 In view of the limited numbers of firms that could be surveyed in each country, the relationship between the size of firms and their ownership type raised problems. To take two examples, without imposing quotas for ownership types for each size category, it is likely that the Polish "small firm" group would have been composed mostly of ab initio private firms, reflecting the strong growth of this sector in Poland in the transition period.
Equally, it is likely that the "large firm" group in Romania would have been mostly composed of stateowned firms, reflecting the slow pace of privatisation there. Ab initio firms were excluded a priori from the "large" category because of the small numbers of such firms in both Poland and Romania economy.
Care must therefore be taken when interpreting the results: the survey provides information on aspects of firms of different ownership types active in certain manufacturing sectors at a point in time, but cannot be used to make straightforward inferences about developments in the enterprise sector as a whole or even within these manufacturing sectors. Among other things, this would require information on the prevalence of each ownership type as well as on the rate at which the ownership structure is being transformed. Neither type of information is available from survey data. We note here that export activity per se was not a criteria for selection, and hence the observed distribution of export activity is driven by the characteristics of the population of firms and not by the sampling procedure.
The survey was conducted in June-September 1998. The main survey was preceded by a pilot survey of 20 firms in each country in March-April, after which revisions to the survey questionnaire were made in the light of the pilot results. Information was collected by on-site interview, typically with one or more members of the top management of the firm. 2 Drawing robust inferences from survey data is hazardous.
Managers may misreport data on performance or misrepresent compliance levels. However it is not clear that any systematic bias is to be expected in manager responses across types of firms within a country or between countries. In interpreting the survey findings, we emphasise the comparisons between firms (within and across countries) rather than the levels (e.g., of compliance) reported.
Ownership, integration and competition: progress in transition?
The 'establishment of a market economy' and the 'capacity to withstand competitive pressures in the EU market' are intimately connected with progress in transition. In a market economy, enterprise survival depends on the ability to withstand competitive pressure from domestic and foreign firms without subsidies from the government.
In this section, we use the survey data to examine a number of dimensions of the structure and performance of firms in transition countries and to compare them with the benchmark Spanish firms. In terms of performance, the focus is on whether there are identifiable differences between the stateowned, privatised and ab initio firms. Is the move from an economy comprised entirely of state-owned enterprises to a market economy through the creation of new firms ab initio and through privatisation reflected in performance differences across the ownership types and do the private firms in the transition countries resemble Spanish firms more closely than the state-owned ones? This raises the related question of how the ownership structure of the private firms in Poland and Romania compares with that of Spanish firms. The logic of privatisation as a component of the transition process is that corporate governance in privatised firms would have to improve relative to governance under state ownership.
Increased competition from domestic and foreign firms has been viewed as a core mechanism for raising efficiency in transition countries. The rapidity with which firms in Eastern Europe reoriented their sales from the former CMEA to European Union markets has been one of the most remarkable features of the transition (see EBRD, 1997; Gros and Steinherr, 1995) . One indicator of how well East European firms have become integrated in the European Union market is the degree of similarity between the exporting activity of Eastern European firms and their EU counterparts. The use of survey data enables us to establish whether they are similarly export oriented, whether they perceive similar levels of import competition and whether the quality profile of export as compared with domestic sales is similar to that of EU firms. We can also compare how managers judge the competitiveness of the market in which they compete across ownership types and across countries.
A major objective of the European Single Market programme ('1992 Programme') was to create a borderless market within the EU in the sense that the conditions of 'export' sales from one EU member to another would be indistinguishable from sales within the home country (see, for example, Allen et al., 1998) . By including Spain in the survey, we can establish an EU benchmark for the 'gap' between firms exporting to the EU and those confined to the home market; are Spanish firms that only sell in the domestic market different from the Spanish firms that export to the EU? As the single market becomes a reality, one would expect such differences to diminish. Given that the Polish and Romanian firms do not belong to this 'single market', we hypothesise that there would be more substantial differences between those firms oriented to selling into the EU market and those selling at home within each of the East European countries. The conditions of competition, for example, might well be different. If it were the case that the characteristics of firms in the transition economies that were selling successfully in the EU market were indistinguishable from those of firms selling only at home, one would be less concerned about the capability of the latter to survive under single market conditions. To the extent that differences persist, it is important to know whether these are related to standard indicators of progress in transition such as ownership type. Table 1 presents the basic descriptive data for the firms surveyed. The table also presents average and median employment by the three ownership categories for the transition countries. As one would expect from the discussion of the sampling design, there is a clear correlation between ownership and size:
Measurement issues
state-owned firms tend to be the largest, followed by privatised firms, with new private firms the smallest. This raises the possibility that observed differences in average characteristics across firms in different ownership categories resulting from a simple comparison of means may be driven in part, or in whole, by size differences rather than by characteristics genuinely related to the ownership status of firms. For this reason, we control for the size of firm in all of the comparisons that are made.
It is also possible in the empirical work that factors related to progress in transition will be hard to distinguish from country differences. Poland entered the transition at a higher level of development than did Romania, had a pre-existing ab initio private sector in manufacturing, began the transition earlier, emerged more quickly from the 'transition-recession', and has experienced many more years of growth than has been the case for Romania (see EBRD 1998).
Our approach to statistical testing of ownership and country differences is therefore as follows.
Differences in firm characteristics are tested using a multivariate regression framework with the characteristic of interest as the dependent variable and the inclusion of size variable (log employment)
as a regressor (control variable). Ownership effects are allowed to vary across countries through the inclusion of interacted ownership and country dummies, thus enabling us to test country-ownership differences ("Are Romanian privatised firms different from Romanian state-owned firms? From Polish state-owned firms? From Spanish firms?").
An important problem that is specific to the data with which we are working is that the Romanian economy experienced a significant setback in 1997, with industrial output declining by 6% after two years of strong growth, and with inflation reaching 150% for the year. We therefore compare the 1996 performance of the Romanian firms in the survey with the 1997 performance of the Polish and Spanish firms.
Performance, governance and ownership
The debate about how to measure firm performance under conditions of transition is unresolved (but see Carlin et al., 1995; Earle and Estrin, 1997; Frydman et al. 1998a; Estrin and Wright, 1999) . Rather than focusing on a single measure, we present several.
A measure of profitability is often used as a measure of performance but its interpretation is clouded by the fact that it will also reflect conditions of product market competition. Moreover, in transition economies it suffers in addition from well-known reporting and measurement problems. When inflation is high, the interpretation of the profit to sales ratio is especially difficult because of the upward bias introduced by historical cost accounting; 3 this is a particular problem for Romania, where PPI inflation was 50% in 1996, compared to PPI inflation rates of 9% for Poland and 1% for Spain in 1997. We have attempted to correct the data for the effects of inflation 4 but the comparisons between Romanian and other firms should still be treated with caution. We report profitability (gross operating surplus 5 as a proportion of sales revenue) in Table 1 , which shows that profits are higher in the Polish ab initio firms than in Spanish firms but otherwise Polish and Spanish firms are similar. This may reflect temporary supernormal profits as start-up firms exploit empty market niches. Romanian private firms, both privatised and ab initio private, also appear more profitable than their Spanish counterparts, but this may simply reflect the data problems discussed above.
Considerable theoretical and empirical evidence has accumulated that adjustment to a market economy takes place in stages (see Blanchard, 1997; World Bank, 1996) . Initially managers react to the introduction of market forces and the hardening of their budget constraints by cutting costs. One indicator of this is labour-shedding (see, e.g., Estrin, Gelb and Singh, 1995; Belka et al, 1995) . We first look at the extent to which firms in the sample identify the existence of labour hoarding 6 and then at the changes in employment that are reported. Another component of early adjustment is to find markets for the output of the firm. Whilst macroeconomic conditions exert a strong influence over the growth of output in the country, it is instructive to look at the pattern of growth of sales where firms are distinguished by ownership type. A second stage of restructuring has been characterised in terms of the emergence of a strategic orientation of firms (see Carlin et al, 1995) . Observable indicators of deep restructuring are usually taken to be investment in fixed capital or human capital or in R&D (see EBRD, 1997 ).
In the early stage of transition, excess labour in the state sector will be shed by state and former state firms, as managers act to contain costs in the face of increasing competition and declining state support.
As transition proceeds, one would expect employment reduction to stop in privatised firms as their sales pick up. However, somewhat surprisingly, we find in Table 2 that the survey data for 1997 shows that this pattern has not yet emerged in Poland. Growth of employment in ab initio firms is rapid and indistinguishable from that of Spanish firms whilst privatised firms as well as SOEs continue to contract. The pattern is the same in Romania.
The explanation for why we do not yet find most privatised Polish firms expanding their employment may, however, be an anomalous feature of the Polish transition. In spite of progress in transition on the dimensions discussed above, Table 2 suggests that Polish state and privatised firms stand out from their hoarding in the state sector, as measured by comparison with Spanish firms, but not elsewhere.
There is some support, however, from the survey for the pattern in sales growth predicted by models of transition. The setback to transition in Romania in 1997 highlights the role of macroeconomic factors and should be kept in mind when interpreting The recovery of investment activity is frequently referred to in the transition literature as an indicator of 'deep' restructuring and of progress in transition beyond the initial stage of reactive or defensive restructuring (see EBRD, 1996) . It is thought to require managers who are oriented toward the future profitability and strategic development of the firm, as compared with the initial transition task of surviving the marketization shock. It would be expected that privatisation in the presence of effective corporate governance would be associated with higher investment. The results reported in Table 2 indicate that both privatised and ab initio private firms in Poland have substantially higher investment shares than is the case in Spain, in line with the expected pattern as transition proceeds. Although ab initio Romanian firms are investing more than Spanish ones, the situation in Romanian privatised ones looks poor with investment well below that in the Polish privatised ones and no different from the levels in Romanian state firms. In both training and R&D activity, Polish and Spanish firms are alike with levels significantly higher than Romanian ones. There is also some evidence that Polish privatised and ab initio private firms have a significantly higher share of marketing staff in total employment (at Spanish levels) than do state firms in Poland or all firms in Romania.
The difference between the Polish and Romanian privatised firms therefore appears from our survey to be that the former are engaged in 'deep' restructuring (as indicated, for example, by their investment rates) even though their workers have often been able to exert enough influence to protect jobs. By contrast, Romanian privatised firms are still in the earlier phase of 'reactive' low-investment restructuring.
Further light is thrown on the role of ownership transformation by looking at the mechanisms through which ownership structure may affect performance. The literature on corporate governance proposes a employment in your firm compare to the desired level of employment of the firm?
solution to the agency problem that arises when ownership and control in a firm are separated, namely concentrated ownership. The presence of a shareholder with a substantial stake helps to overcome the standard free rider problem in control. For this to be a solution requires in turn that the large shareholder is motivated by the objective of value maximisation and that the private benefits that are derived from ownership do not conflict with this. In short, for concentrated ownership to be effective, the owner needs not just to have the capability of monitoring management but also the incentive to do so in the pursuit of efficiency rather than private gain (for example, through asset expropriation). The understanding of the precise determinants of 'effective' corporate governance is far from complete even in a market economy (see, for example, the survey by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Our aim here is to highlight the similarities and differences between ownership concentration in the Spanish economy and in the private sector of the transition countries.
We find that in terms of concentration, Spanish firms look different from those in the transition countries (Table 3) . Ownership is significantly more likely to be concentrated in Spain and there is no significant difference between Poland and Romania. Ownership is less concentrated in Poland and Romania in privatised firms, which suggests the possibility of more serious monitoring problems.
It has frequently been suggested in the debates about transition that sales of ownership stakes to foreign owners represent an attractive method of privatisation because it would bring in an owner with profit orientation and with access to finance for investment, to management expertise and to markets in the West (see, e.g., Meyer, 1998; Estrin, Hughes and Todd, 1998) . It is interesting to note that foreign ownership is much more prevalent amongst the Spanish firms (over 40% reported a foreign ownership stake) than amongst either privatised or ab initio private firms in Poland (11% for both privatised and ab initio private) or Romania (5%, also for both privatised and ab initio private). The high foreign ownership of Spanish firms reflects changes in Spain as a consequence of EU accession and of the single market measures and provides a pointer to what might be expected for the Eastern European countries after accession.
One mechanism that may inhibit transfers of ownership to foreigners or concentration of ownership and hence hamper improvements in corporate governance is the design of privatisation programmes. Some methods of privatization favour enterprise-insiders and could lead to the entrenchment of incumbent managers who become owners (see Blasi and Shleifer, 1996; Barberis et al, 1996, Aghion and Blanchard, 1994) . The survey results point toward the need for further investigation of the question of whether 'insider-privatisation' has inhibited the transfer of ownership and thereby slowed down both the concentration of ownership and the growth of foreign ownership in the case of Polish privatised firms (which look different from Spanish ones on both counts).
It has long been emphasised in the literature that selection issues in the privatisation process make untangling the ownership-corporate governance-performance link very difficult. Using the survey data, we have not found clear evidence in support of the mechanisms through which ownership concentration enhances corporate governance along the lines suggested in Frydman, Gray and Rapaczynski (1996) .
For example, we were interested in whether there was any connection between firms in which there was a new outside general manager (i.e. a general manager coming from outside the firm but excluding cases where the general manager was present at the establishment of a start-up) and levels or changes in performance (see Barberis et al, 1996) . There appear to be few discernible patterns. One exception was a weakly significant result for privatised Polish firms, for which we found that a new outside general manager was more likely in firms for which there was a single majority owner.
We also asked whether the present general manager had replaced a poorly performing one. The affirmative answer was significantly more common in both Poland and Romania than in Spain. This underlines the character of the transition process, even in the early stage in Romania, as one in which there is an unusually high degree of managerial turnover. Poor managerial performance can apparently be recognised and replacement brought about.
Competition and international integration
One of the main objectives of the European Union's Single market programme was to increase the level of product market competition in Europe. This was expected to produce both static and dynamic efficiency gains (e.g., Baldwin 1989) . Recent evidence supports the claim that the programme has been associated with substantial pro-competitive effects, which have been measured in the significant decline in price-cost margins in domestic markets (Allen et al., 1998) . The evidence suggests that the EU may have moved some way from a world of segmented national markets. The introduction of competition into the environment for enterprises has been a major component of the transition reforms (see e.g. EBRD, 1998; World Bank, 1996) . Accession to the EU would represent a further stepping up of the pressure of competition. The inclusion of Spain in the survey provides a benchmark against which the pressure of competition felt by Eastern European firms could be measured.
Firms were asked if in the market for their main product, they faced zero competitors, between one and five competitors or more than five. There was no significant difference in the judgements of Spanish firms and private (i.e. privatised and ab initio) firms in Poland as to their competitive environment (see competition. Finally, the transition firms best adapted to the market economy are in more settled markets and perceive a pattern of competition similar to that of market-economy firms.
The findings for the importance attached to competition from imports are also interesting in this regard.
There is a clear split between the Eastern European firms and the Spanish ones. Import competition is more frequently viewed as important by the transition than the market economy firms (see Table 4 ). As would have been expected, Spanish firms are more likely to export to the EU than is the case for the Eastern European firms, irrespective of ownership type. In neither Poland nor Romania does it appear that the exporting activity of state firms is dominated by a legacy of trade links with former CMEA countries. Indeed, in Poland it is ab initio firms that have the strongest trade links with former CMEA countries. This probably reflects the seizure of market opportunities by Polish entrepreneurs -for example, in successfully identifying profitable market niches in the Russian economy in the wake of liberalisation. The parallel in Romania to this group of Polish start-ups is a dozen ab initio firms that are specialist exporters selling at least three-quarters of their output to the EU -all are clothing firms, and smaller than average.
Since Spanish firms are operating in the single European market, one would expect that there would be less difference between the price-quality characteristics of goods exported and those sold at home than would be the case for firms in a market segmented from the EU. Firms in Eastern Europe, for example, may have a domestic market that is protected from pan-European competition and in which different conditions of sale (e.g., product standards) apply whereas exports must sell in 'head-to-head' competition under the same conditions with the products of EU-based firms. Respondents to the survey were asked to identify the main product that was exported and asked if that particular product was also sold at home. For firms that sold the same product at home and abroad, we then asked whether the exported good was of lower, higher or the same quality. As shown in Table 5 , virtually all Spanish firms did sell the same good at home and abroad and it was of the same quality. Many fewer Polish firms sold the same good at home and abroad and even fewer Romanian ones did so. In an interesting reflection of the closer convergence of Poland to Spain, Polish private firms, both privatised and ab initio private, tended to sell the same quality of good -just like the Spanish firms. By contrast, Polish state-owned firms looked like Romanian firms (of all types), with a greater tendency to sell higher quality goods for export than for the home market.
Summary
Looking across the dimensions of performance, ownership and governance, and competition and integration in international trade, our survey suggests that there are a number of respects in which there is a significant gap between Spanish firms on the one hand and Eastern European ones -both Polish and Romanian -on the other. The differences emerge most clearly in some aspects of governance, international engagement and competition. Spanish firms are more likely to have a single majority owner and they are more likely to be foreign owned. This suggests the presence of more effective corporate governance in the Spanish than in the transition firms. The perception of import competition is substantially higher in the Eastern European economies than in Spain. As noted above, this apparently counter-intuitive result may simply reflect the progress that has been made in the single European market, with Spanish firms ceasing to think in terms of 'import' and 'domestic' competition. This interpretation is supported by the finding that hardly any Spanish firms are not engaged in sales to other EU countries. The share of exports to the EU by Spanish firms is significantly higher than for transition firms confirming that Spanish firms are more integrated in the EU than those from Poland and Romania.
The results in this section suggest that in a number of respects Polish ab initio private firms, and to a lesser extent Polish privatised firms and Romanian ab initio firms, are more similar to Spanish firms and different from Romanian state-owned and privatised ones. One would expect to observe this pattern as transition proceeds, with private sector firms -whether their origins were in the state-owned sector or as start-ups -coming to look more like firms in long-established market economies. Clear convergence of Polish firms toward Spanish ones is revealed by the distribution of exporting activity across firms. As vividly depicted in the histograms (Figure 1 ), Romania is characterised by a set of specialist exporting firms. Such firms are absent from the Spanish sample and relatively rare in the Polish sample.
Two other results emerge that capture differences within Eastern Europe. 
Compliance with EU directives and regulations
In evaluating how ready East European firms are to operate in the European Single Market, one dimension that can be measured is the extent of compliance with EU directives and regulations. The survey instrument was designed both to identify direct measures of compliance (e.g., by asking for the proportion of the workforce that works for more than x hours per week) and to gauge the perception of managers as to their degree of compliance after the content of a directive was explained. There was a close correspondence between the results from the direct measures and the self-assessment of whether the firm would have satisfied an EU inspector making an unannounced visit to check compliance. 8 From the perspective of policy design, a central issue is whether levels of compliance were inherited from the pre-transition period and whether there is any relationship between ownership type or other transition indicators in the extent of compliance in Eastern Europe.
Equal pay directive
Reported compliance levels with the equal pay directive were uniformly high across all three countries (see Table 6 ). There were no size or ownership effects in the extent of compliance reported at the time of the survey. Firms in the Eastern European countries reported that compliance levels had been as required by the Directive for at least five years or since start-up. Somewhat surprisingly, current compliance levels had been achieved relatively recently amongst the state firms with only just over onehalf of SOEs in Poland and only one-quarter of those in Romania meeting directive levels in 1989 or earlier.
Working time directive
Although compliance with the working time directive is high in the Eastern European countries -with over three-quarters of firms reporting high compliance, Spain is still ahead of Poland and Poland ahead of Romania (see Table 6 ). It appears that Polish ab initio firms are still behind other Polish firms in compliance and suggests that any government effort in raising compliance levels would need to be directed toward start-up firms in Poland. In Romania, compliance levels are uniform across ownership types at a lower level than for Poland.
Occupational safety directive
In meeting the occupational safety directive, Polish firms report the same level of compliance as Spanish ones. 9 This applies across the board irrespective of ownership type (see Table 6 ). Only one-third of the Polish state firms had current levels of compliance in 1989, which indicates that adjustment has taken place during transition. Most privatised and ab initio firms report that current levels were achieved from privatisation or start-up or earlier. Romanian firms are well behind the others in compliance.
Interestingly, it is new start-ups in Romania that show higher compliance levels -at least as compared with SOEs. Start-up firms in both Poland and Romania indicated that substantial changes were required in order to meet the compliance levels specified in the directive. In neither case was outside help a significant factor in making the necessary changes.
Product certification requirements for exports to the EU; ISO certification
For firms outside the EU any exports to the EU must comply with product certification procedures.
Polish firms were more aware of these requirements than were Romanian firms (see Table 7 ). The second question that we wanted to pursue was whether there was any difference in their awareness of these requirements according to whether a firm was engaged in selling goods in the EU market. In Section 2 above, it emerged that Polish firms appeared to be more integrated into the EU market whereas in Romania a group of specialist exporting firms existed. Another indicator of integration would be an awareness of certification requirements for exports even amongst firms that did not currently export. The survey results suggest that there is a distinction between Polish and Romanian firms along these lines. Polish firms seem to be equally aware of the certification requirements for exports to the EU even when they are not selling into that market. By contrast, whilst Romanian exporters were just as conscious of the requirements as Polish firms, the level of awareness amongst non-exporters was much lower.
Familiarity with export certification requirements does not vary according to the type of ownership of the firm or whether or not ownership is concentrated -it seems to be a country effect. Firms that claimed to be familiar with the export certification requirements were also asked how much of their output meets these requirements. The share of output meeting this standard is highest in Polish privatised and ab initio private firms and Romanian privatised ones. For Romanian start-ups and state firms, the share of output meeting the standard was significantly lower. This highlights the greater depth of convergence to EU standards across the Polish private sector and underlines the specialisation of Romanian privatised firms in exporting activity. To pursue this question further, we were interested in finding out the crosscountry differences in ISO quality standards certification as another proxy for EU product standards in the internal market.
Spanish firms were significantly more likely to have ISO9000 certification with nearly two-thirds of firms (controlling for size of firm) complying (Table 6 ). By contrast less than one-quarter of firms in Poland and Romania had ISO certification. There was no difference between Polish and Romanian firms, no ownership differences and no tendency for exporting firms to have certification more often than non-exporting firms. However, one intriguing pattern does emerge. In both Poland and Romania, there is a tendency for firms that dominate their market (i.e. that identify no competitors for their main product) to be more likely to have ISO-certification. In Romania, for example, of the 28 firms that say they dominate the market, over half have ISO certification. An appealing interpretation could be that these firms are subcontractors with the foreign purchasing firm assisting with ISO certification. This hypothesis is refuted by the data however -over the half the firms are state-owned and only one-quarter do any sub-contracting at all.
in that country; e.g., what is seen as a satisfactory standard of equipment in Romania may not be acceptable in Spain.
Polish firms that achieved current compliance levels for export certification in 1995 or later indicated that the changes required in order to do so involved fixed investment, training and changes in the production process in equal measure. The corresponding Romanian firms less frequently mentioned training. Most Polish and Romanian firms received no outside help in achieving compliance: a handful of firms in each country mentioned that they had had some foreign help. There was a somewhat higher level of outside help reported for the achievement of ISO certification with about one half of Polish firms reporting outside assistance, most often from a foreign customer, partner or owner. There was sparse mention of government help. The Polish firms with ISO virtually all mentioned the need for increased training with about one-half noting the need for new investment and changes in the production process. Romanian firms with ISO appear to have done so without outside assistance as would be expected from their characteristics noted above.
Emissions monitoring
In a wide-ranging survey of firms from a variety of manufacturing sectors, there was limited scope for investigating environmental aspects of the acquis in any detail. Our approach was to focus on the capability of firms to measure emissions from their production facilities. We sought to divide firms into those with emissions monitoring equipment, those without it but aware that they should have it, and the final group that saw no requirement to have monitoring equipment. There was a clear split between Spanish firms and Eastern European ones. Just under half of the Spanish firms have monitoring equipment with the rest stating they are not required to do so. No Spanish firms said that they should but do not have equipment.
The presence of monitoring equipment is much sparser in Eastern Europe -with no discernible difference between Poland and Romania and no influence of ownership type, corporate governance, pressure of competition or involvement in exporting. Less than one fifth of firms were able to monitor emissions and over seventy per cent stated that there was no requirement for them to do so. A small but significant number of firms in both countries stated that they should but did not have monitoring capability. This comparison suggests that compliance is higher in Spain, it is better enforced and that regulations are tougher.
Costs of compliance
It is extremely difficult to elicit reliable information from firms about the costs of compliance with regulations. In many cases, managers will not be able to separate out that component of an investment project or of training expenditure or of costs of production that would have been saved had they not improved their level of compliance. We have some information from firms for which managers reported that some of their investment over the past three years had added to their standard of compliance and 20 who made an estimate of the proportion of investment spending that would have been saved had they not sought to improve compliance. There are between 20 and 30 firms from each of Poland and Romania involved in each case. Estimates of the proportion of investment that would have been saved
are 'large' and should not be taken too literally. For example, for each directive over half of the Romanian firms reporting on the proportion of their investment that would have been saved had they not improved compliance said that they would have saved more than ten per cent.
The results are quite consistent with the pattern of compliance outlined above. In general, there was a tendency for Romanian firms to indicate a heavier burden than Polish ones. Product certification appears to have been especially onerous for Romanian firms with 24 out of the 27 firms involved reporting a saving of more than 10 per cent of their investment outlays had they not complied. It is worth recalling that investment levels by Romanian firms were very low (especially amongst privatised firms). It is notable that Polish and Romanian firms with emissions monitoring equipment reported significantly higher levels of running costs than was true of the Spanish firms.
Summary
Spain stands out from the East European countries in its compliance with the working time directive, its levels of ISO certification and emissions monitoring. Based on the judgements of managers, Polish firms are indistinguishable from Spanish firms and ahead of Romanian firms in occupational safety compliance. In terms of export product certification, Poland stands out from Romania reflecting a deeper level of 'integration awareness' that includes firms that do not currently export to the EU. On the harsher criterion of ISO certification, there is no discernible difference between the East European countries. This confirms the emerging picture of a group of 'top-flight' privatised firms in Romania that are comparable to Polish ones but a longer tail of firms for which the gap to EU standards is much more substantial. Only on equal pay, is there no clear gap between the firms in Eastern Europe and in Spain.
From the survey results, it seems that transition indicators (ownership type and corporate governance) and conditions of competition in the product market are not decisive in explaining levels of compliance.
Country differences dominate the picture of compliance levels. A concern that at least some compliance levels may have been driven by legacies from the pre-transition period with the consequence that new start-ups would lag behind has not been confirmed by the survey results. Surprisingly the levels of compliance by 1989 were often low for state firms with adjustment there occurring during transition.
The only exception worthy of note is the lagging behind of Polish start-up firms in meeting the working time directive.
Competing in a single market: preparedness and perceptions of transition firms
In sections 3 and 4, a picture was built up of the characteristics of firms in Poland and Romania and they were compared with Spanish firms. On a number of dimensions of performance, structure and compliance with EU directives, a clear gap remains between Eastern European and Spanish firms. Yet there are dimensions on which Polish firms look quite similar to Spanish ones and quite different from Romanian ones. In the compliance indicators, this is usually a country effect but in investment and integration, private ownership -both privatised and ab initio -is often a correlate of convergence with Spain. State-owned Polish firms, and all Romanian firms except new private firms, tend to be laggards in adjustment. These results are quite reassuring since progress in transition in the leading transition economy is producing measurable convergence.
In addition to the specific dimensions of convergence in terms of performance, integration and compliance, we investigated the perceptions of firms about accession to the EU and asked them to identify the most important impediments to the implementation of their business plans. When asked for a subjective assessment of the likely costs of accession, firms in Poland and Romania produced remarkably similar responses (Table 8 ). The first-ranked cost in both cases (identified by half the firms as the most important) was the cost of compliance with EU regulations. Competition from the EU was ranked second (one-quarter of firms) and third was the fear of the loss of skilled labour (about one in ten firms). Asked to assess the actual costs of accession, Spanish firms pointed to competition from EU countries (one half of firms), the cost of compliance with EU regulations (one-quarter) and competition from non-EU countries as the third (one-fifth).
The benefits identified by firms in Poland and Romania were much more diffuse than the assessment of costs and there was less concordance with the ex post views of the Spanish firms (Table 8) . Managers of Polish and Romanian firms felt that accession would help them to find a foreign partner, give them access to new technology, to cheap credit, to a large market and assist because of the abolition of tariffs.
Managers of Spanish firms took the view that the main benefits were the abolition of customs formalities, the future benefits of a common currency and access to a large market.
Features of the economic environment that businesses identify as obstacles to the implementation of business plans can also provide information about the process of adjustment. Managers were invited to rate the importance of each factor separately before being asked to nominate the most important impediment. The factors they were asked to consider were: delays and difficulties getting planning permission; problems with legal permission or licenses to produce or operate; delays at customs for exports or imports; difficulties in obtaining short term, or long-term bank credit, late payment by domestic, or foreign customers; problems with inconsistent taxation, changes in tax regulations, too many different taxes; illegality and corruption; environmental regulation.
When asked to identify the most important obstacle, the Spanish firms in the sample spread themselves rather widely across the possible answers. There was no particular focus of discontent. By contrast, more than one-third of the Romanian and over 40% of the Polish firms pointed to the late payment by domestic customers as the main impediment to their business plans. The other focus for complaint in Eastern Europe was the inconsistent, complex and unpredictable nature of taxation. (The interviewer was specifically directed to emphasise that it was not the level of taxation that was at issue.) It is striking that it was only the privatised and ab initio firms that identified taxation as a serious problem for their firm. Problems with payments arrears may still reflect the adjustment of firms in Eastern Europe to how a market economy works rather than the existence of a much more serious problem in payment delays than in Spain. It is notable, however, that the Polish firms were no less likely to identify this as a major problem than the Romanian ones. The unpredictability of the tax environment has been identified as a particularly serious problem for the countries that are lagging in transition. The results here suggest that Polish private firms are very concerned with this issue. Very few firms in any of the three countries identified corruption as a major problem.
Conclusions
A major innovation of this study is to have used a market economy and member country of the EUSpain -as a benchmark against which to measure progress in transition and toward 'readiness' for accession. As might have been expected, Spain is often ahead on the measures of performance, integration and compliance that have been examined but we have identified a number of dimensions on which Polish firms look similar to Spanish ones. On the measures of integration and investment, it is Polish ab initio and privatised firms that look most similar to the Spanish. Polish state-owned firms often lag behind and look much more like Romanian firms than like either Polish privatised or ab initio private firms. The fact that the investment share of Polish privatised firms is higher than that of Spanish firms suggests that the ownership structure and economic environment of these former state firms is able to support a process of catch-up growth of the kind assumed in the macroeconomic convergence exercises referred to in the introduction. We have also found evidence that there is a smaller gap in Poland between some characteristics of firms that are already competing in the EU market and firms that are only selling in the domestic market than is the case for Romania. This provides another measurable indicator of the depth of integration and hence of progress toward 'readiness' for accession since the presence of a large gap between these two groups of firms would indicate that considerable adjustment is still required for the firms operating only in the domestic market.
Taking a broad overview of compliance with EU directives, Poland tends to lag behind Spain but lie significantly ahead of Romania. The Eastern European firms perceived a heavy cost burden associated with raising compliance especially in connection with emissions monitoring. A heavy burden was also identified by the Romanian firms in relation to export product certification. There were fewer problems with complying with equal pay, working time and -for the Polish firms -with occupational safety directives. Levels of awareness of and compliance with directives did not vary with ownership type amongst the Eastern European firms or with their involvement in exporting. The hypothesis that compliance was legacy-based and hence more likely to characterise state or formerly state-owned firms than start-ups was not confirmed. The data available from this study suggests that compliance levels may be fairly uniform within a country. Progress in transition at the country level seems to be consistent with improvements in compliance. At least from this study, there is little sign of a conflict between the goals of transition toward a market economy and the improvement in compliance with the major components of the acquis. Statistical tests are based on an ordered logit regression with dependent variable =0 if export quality is higher than the same product sold domestically, =1 if export quality is the same, =2 if export quality is lower, and with country/ownership dummy variables (benchmark category is Spain) as explanatory variables. Reported statistical significance vs. Spain follows from tests of the significance of the coefficients on the ownership dummy variables. Regression includes log employment as a control for size effects. "Test vs. Spain" column report a "−" if the shortfall in quality of goods sold domestically compared to export quality is greater in the row category than it is in Spain, a "+" if the shortfall is lower than in Spain, and "0" if there is no statistically significant difference. All tests use a significance level of 5%. 
